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Abstract
In this paper, we measure the welfare costs/gains associated with ¯nancial market incom-
pleteness in a monetary union. To do this, we build on a two-country model of a monetary
union with sticky prices subject to asymmetric productivity shocks. For most plausible val-
ues of price stickiness, we show that asymmetric shocks under incomplete ¯nancial markets
give rise to a lower volatility of national in°ation rates, which proves welfare improving with
respect to the situation of complete ¯nancial markets. The corresponding welfare gains are
equivalent to an average increase of 1.8% of permanent consumption.
Keywords: monetary union, asymmetric shocks, price stickiness, ¯nancial market incomplete-
ness, welfare.
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11 Introduction
Financial markets integration is traditionally considered of great importance for the smooth
functioning of the European Monetary Union as it constitutes an insurance mechanism fostering
symmetric adjustment to asymmetric shocks. As a matter of fact, the costs of incompleteness in
¯nancial markets, approximating imperfect ¯nancial integration, have been widely documented
(see, for instance, Cole and Obstfeld [1991] and Kim, Kim and Levin [2003a]). More recently,
using a two-country model subject to asymmetric productivity shocks, Benigno [2007] shows
that imperfect risk-sharing and the corresponding path of the real exchange rate generate welfare
costs under °exible prices allocations.1 Means to reduce these costs have also been explored in
the literature. For example, Cole and Obstfeld [1991] show that these types of costs might be
reduced by achieving a deeper trade integration, since incomplete ¯nancial market allocations
may replicate the complete asset markets allocations under speci¯c hypotheses. In this paper,
we argue that the dynamics of in°ation under alternative ¯nancial structures is likely to impact
the costs of ¯nancial markets incompleteness, by a®ecting real exchange rate dynamics and the
pattern of external adjustment.
Focusing on the euro area, recent empirical and theoretical evidence suggest that the common
monetary policy has been successful at keeping aggregate in°ation low. However, they also
point out the impossibility for policymakers to address the consequences of asymmetric shocks
on national in°ation rates. These sets of evidence lead us to raise the following question: what
are the welfare costs/gains associated with incomplete ¯nancial markets in a monetary union
with idiosyncratic productivity shocks and sticky prices? To address this question, we follow
Benigno [2007] and consider a two-country model of a monetary union with sticky prices subject
to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. We model ¯nancial markets either as a continuum of state-
contingent assets, or as a single bond market. Under complete ¯nancial markets, each agent has
the same wealth and the Backus-Smith risk-sharing condition holds. Under incomplete ¯nancial
markets, agents trade composite bonds and use ¯nancial markets to smooth their adjustment to
asymmetric shocks, thereby restoring the external adjustment channel of the current account.
However, since this solution generates a unit root on net foreign assets dynamics, we follow
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2003] and assume the existence of ¯nancial intermediaries levying
portfolio management quadratic costs, depending on the level of bonds traded.
1In his model, °exible prices allocations are restored assuming e±cient price stability policies in both countries.
2We di®er from Benigno [2007] by allowing sticky prices to generate additional ine±ciencies.
We show that the optimal targeting rules implied by the optimal policy stabilize the aggregate
in°ation rate and close the aggregate consumption gap.2 However, monetary instrument rules
that the common central bank may actually use to stabilize the economy, i.e. using a single
interest rate, prevent the stabilization of national in°ation rates, which generates additional
welfare losses with respect to the optimal policy. These losses are crucial in generating our
results.
Based on this framework, we evaluate the welfare costs that a monetary union may endure
when ¯nancial market are complete vs incomplete under simple interest rate rules stabilizing the
aggregate in°ation rate and consumption gap. We more speci¯cally highlight the key role of the
assumption of price stickiness in determining the Pareto{dominant situation. When prices are
°exible, incomplete ¯nancial markets imply imperfect risk{sharing that turns to welfare losses.
These results are consistent with the ones of Kim et al. [2003a]. This case also corresponds to the
situation where independent national monetary policies stabilize national in°ation rates. Under
such a policy, the volatility of in°ation rates and their related welfare losses are equal to zero.
Our results thus comfort those of Benigno [2007]. In line with Cole and Obstfeld [1991], we also
¯nd that a better integration of goods markets, approximated by an increase of the openness
parameter or an increase of the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods,
lowers the welfare losses of imperfect ¯nancial integration. When prices are sticky, we show that
¯nancial markets incompleteness implies a lower volatility of national in°ation rates, thereby
generating welfare gains with respect to the situation of complete ¯nancial markets. Under
incomplete ¯nancial markets, agents may use ¯nancial markets and the channel of the current
account to adjust externally and to smooth their consumption pro¯les in time, thus lowering the
pressure on the terms of trade. As a consequence, the degree of volatility of national in°ation
rates required to adjust to asymmetric shocks is lower. This mechanism leads to signi¯cant
welfare gains that more than compensate the welfare losses due to imperfect risk{sharing.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes the
dynamics of the model and the authorities' loss function. Section 4 determines the optimal
(Ramsey) policy. Section 5 analyzes the dynamics of the model after an asymmetric productivity
2In the model, we assume that governments o®set ¯rst{order distortions, thereby restoring the Pareto{e±ciency
of the steady state. This assumption also avoids that optimal monetary policy targets a non{zero aggregate
in°ation rate.
3shock. Section 6 presents the welfare costs of complete versus incomplete ¯nancial markets and
proceed to some robustness experiments. Conclusions are summarized in Section 7.
2 A two{country model
The model describes a two{country monetary union with a common central bank that controls
the nominal interest rate. Each country is populated by a continuum of households of in¯nite
life, an in¯nite number of ¯rms that are specialized in the production of di®erentiated goods
and a government. Goods markets are characterized by a home bias in consumption bundles
and Calvo{staggered adjustment of prices.
2.1 Households and ¯nancial markets



































= 0. In (1), the parameter
¯ = (1 + ±)¡1 is the subjective discount factor, Ci
t(j) is the consumption bundle chosen by
the representative agent, Ni
t(j) is its competitive labor supply, ½ is the degree of consumption
risk{aversion and Ã¡1 is the elasticity of labor supply. In (2);Wi
t is the nominal wage in country




t(k;j)dk is the pro¯t paid by national ¯rms to the representative
national agent j. Bi
t(j) corresponds to the holding of the composite one{period nominal bond at
the end of period (t ¡ 1) which pays a gross nominal rate of interest Rt between periods (t¡1)
and t, Ti
t(j) is a lump-sum tax paid by household j to the national government of country i.
Finally, Pi
t is the consumer price index in country i in period t, Pi;t is the producer price index in
country i in period t and ACi
t(j) is a portfolio adjustment cost paid in units of domestic goods.
In the case detailed above, the ¯nancial market of the monetary union is incomplete and
households trade a one{period composite ¯nancial asset. Buying (resp. selling) bonds a®ects
3The model features no money holdings, since money is endogenously supplied depending on the level of
nominal interest rate.
4negatively (resp. positively) the individualized interest rate, so that: (i) agents have a strong
incentive to return to their initial position in the long run; and (ii) agents belonging to a creditor
country face lower nominal interest rates than agents in the debtor country. As underlined by
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2003], this assumption is a convenient way to balance the current
account in the long run between union members while preserving its short{run dynamics. We










where Bi(j) is the steady state level of ¯nancial assets hold by agent j in country i. Portfolio

















¤¡1. The value of Â a®ects the intertemporal
consumption choice in (3): an increase in the cost of bond trading reduces the sensitivity of
wealth accumulation to variation in the interest rate, because it becomes more costly to smooth
consumption.
In the case of complete markets, agents are supposed to have access to a continuum of
Arrow{Debreu securities and portfolio costs vanish (Â = 0 and ACi
t = 0). In such a case,


















Following Corsetti [2006], we assume home bias in ¯nal consumption bundles. The consump-












































is the home bias, which also measures the openness of the ¯nal goods market

























f;t(k;j)) is the consumption of a typical ¯nal good k of home (resp. foreign)
country by the representative consumer j of country i and µ > ¹ is the elasticity of substitution
between national varieties of ¯nal goods. We assume that ¯rms do not discriminate the market
they address and that their retail prices are identical in both countries. The corresponding
prices of domestic and foreign goods in country i are, Pi











Accordingly, optimal variety demands are,
Ci













































Firms produce k varieties in country i 2 fh;fg using national labor according to a standard
technology,
Y i
t (k) = Ai
tLi
t(k), with Ai




t+1 is an i.i.d innovation.




selected ¯rms is allowed to set new prices each period. Firms set prices higher in comparison of
the typical mark-up pricing, depending on the expected period during which they will be unable

































6In this expression, ¿ is a subsidy that compensates the distorting e®ects of monopolistic
competition in the economy.4 Y i
t (k) is the aggregate demand facing ¯rm k on the ¯nal goods
market. Aggregating among ¯nal ¯rms and assuming behavioral symmetry of Calvo producers,










Fiscal policy is aimed at closing ¯rst order distortions related to the monopolistic structure of
¯nal goods markets. Governments ¯nance the corresponding subsidy made to ¯rms through a








































that satis¯es households and ¯rms

















in a way that is compatible with the clearing of markets described below.








µ¡1 and assuming ®h = ® and
®f = 1 ¡ ®, ¯nal goods markets clear according to,
Y h














































t(k)dk; and the aggregate production
function of country i 2 fh;fg is Y i
t DPi;t = Ai
tNi







dk ¸ 1 is the
dispersion of production prices in country i.









t (j)dj = 0:
4Monopolistic competition distorts the ¯rst-best allocation through mark-up pricing and a lower output. As
shown by Benigno and Woodford [2005], an optimal subsidy policy restores the optimal perfectly competitive
allocation.
7Finally, consolidating households, governments and ¯rms resources constraints, the dynamics
of net foreign assets in country h is given by
Bh
t+1 ¡ RtBh




3 A linear-quadratic framework
We solve the model applying standard linearization methods. We ¯rst de¯ne the optimal mon-
etary policy as the minimization of a welfare loss function constrained by the model. This
approach usually requires that the model is solved with a second order approximation, to avoid
spurious welfare reversals documented by Kim, Kim and Levin [2003b]. However, Benigno and
Woodford [2006] have shown that the solution of the optimal policy problem can be set in the
convenient linear-quadratic form while remaining valid when the second order approximation
of the welfare{based loss function yields a purely quadratic function, which is the case in our
framework.
3.1 Steady state
We solve the model in logdeviation with respect to the symmetric steady state. In the symmetric
steady state Ai = A = 1 and Bi = B = 0. Symmetry imposes Ph = Pf = Ph = Pf = P¤
i (k)




µ A. The compensation of ¯rst order distortions requires
that the government sets ¿ = (1 ¡ µ)
¡1 · 0, implying W
P = A. Portfolio costs are zero so that
I = R = ¯¡1. Price indexes are such that DP = 1, ¯nal goods markets give C = Y , and the
production function is Y = AN. Combining these relations with the leisure arbitrage, we get,
Y = A
1+Ã
Ã+½. For tractability, we simply assume A = 1, implying Y = C = N = W
P = 1. Since
the model features no money holding, the price level is de¯ned arbitrarily to P = 1.
3.2 The model in deviation from the natural equilibrium
The natural equilibrium, corresponding to the °exible price equilibrium with complete ¯nancial
markets, is considered as the benchmark for the de¯nition of the optimal policy. We thus
express the linear dynamics of the model in deviation from the natural equilibrium. Applying
the standard linearization procedure, we consider xi
t as the logdeviation of Xi
t; 8t for i 2 fh;fg
from the steady state. De¯ning e xt as the natural equilibrium dynamics of xt, we ¯nally de¯ne
the deviation of a variable from the natural equilibrium as b xt = xt ¡ e xt.
83.2.1 The case of complete ¯nancial markets
Under complete ¯nancial markets, the model expressed in deviation from the natural equilibrium
is given by
b nr



















t+1 ¡ b cr
t
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¼h;t = ¯Et f¼h;t+1g + kh
·
(½ + Ã)b cu







¼f;t = ¯Et f¼f;t+1g + kf
·
(½ + Ã)b cu


















2½ and ki = (1¡´i¯)(1¡´i)
´i . In these expressions, e xu
t = 1
2(e xh
t + e x
f
t ) is





t ) its relative value. Eq. (5) is
the contraction of the relative expression of the ¯nal goods market equilibria (for the right-hand
side element) and the relative production functions (for the left-hand side element). Eqs. (6)
and (7) summarize the relative and union-wide expressions of Euler equations. Eqs. (8) and (9)
are the expressions for modi¯ed Phillips curves, obtained by expressing marginal cost in terms
of variables in deviation from the natural equilibrium.
3.2.2 The case of incomplete ¯nancial markets
We now expose the dynamic equilibrium under incomplete ¯nancial markets. Since B = 0, we







. The model in deviation from the natural
equilibrium under incomplete ¯nancial markets is,
b nr
t = (1 ¡ 2®)b cr





























¼h;t = ¯Et f¼h;t+1g + kh [(½ + Ã)b cu
t ¡ Ãb nr
t ¡ ½b cr
t + ®b st]; (14)
¼f;t = ¯Et f¼f;t+1g + kf [(½ + Ã)b cu
t + Ãb nr
t + ½b cr
t ¡ ®b st]; (15)











t = ±b bh
t + ®[2¹(1 ¡ ®) ¡ 1]b st + 2®b cr
t: (17)
9The equations are slightly modi¯ed with respect to the case of complete ¯nancial markets.
Since the Backus-Smith condition does not hold anymore, Eq.(11) indicates that the equilibrium
of the ¯nal goods markets depends both on relative consumption and on the terms of trade.
Eq.(12) is unchanged. Eq.(13) is the contraction of Euler equations and shows how that the
Backus-Smith condition is broken, since Âb bh
t+1 is the gap between relative consumptions and
the terms of trade. Using the current account b bh
t+1 to adjust externally clearly increases the
distance from perfect international risk-sharing. Eqs. (14) and (15) are the expressions for
modi¯ed Phillips curves when relative consumptions and the terms of trade are not tied by the
Backus-Smith condition. Eq.(16) is unchanged. Finally, Eq.(17) describes the dynamics of net
foreign assets where ®[2¹(1 ¡ ®) ¡ 1]b st + 2®b cr
t is the trade balance.
3.3 The authorities loss function
To determine the optimal policy and to rank alternative situations, we adopt a welfare measure



































The welfare measure is computed using second{order approximations of !T and equilibrium













f;t + (½ + Ã)[b cu
t ]
2
+ ¹®(1 ¡ ®)[b st]
2 + ½[b cr
t]
2 + Ã [b nr
t]
2g + t:i:p + O
¡° °»3° °¢
: (18)
The welfare measure (18) admits standard arguments, such as national in°ation rates and the
aggregate consumption gap. However, the welfare measure also penalizes regional asymmetries,
since deviations of terms of trade, of relative consumption and of relative e®ort are costly.
4 Optimal policy under complete ¯nancial markets
In this section, we compute the optimal plan under complete ¯nancial markets. It is de¯ned as
the minimization of the welfare loss function (18) subject to the linear dynamic system (5)-(10).
10Assuming that the social planner can commit for an in¯nity of periods and adopting Wood-











f;t + (½ + Ã)[b cu
t ]
2 + ¹®(1 ¡ ®)[b st]
2 + ½[b cr
t]





¼h;t ¡ ¯Et f¼h;t+1g ¡ kh
·
(½ + Ã)b cu








¼f;t ¡ ¯Et f¼f;t+1g ¡ kf
·
(½ + Ã)b cu



















After some algebra, ¯rst order conditions collapse to the following optimal targeting rules,
µ
2
(¼h;t + ¼f;t) = ¡(1 ¡ ·)
¡
b cu










(¼f;t ¡ ¼h;t) = ¡
¡
b nr















augmented with the following constraints,
¼h;t = ¯Et f¼h;t+1g + kh
·
(½ + Ã)b cu







¼f;t = ¯Et f¼f;t+1g + kf
·
(½ + Ã)b cu
















The corresponding 7 equations - 7 variables recursive system requires that the condition
kh = kf = k is veri¯ed to have a unique and stable solution.
In the equilibrium, combining the ¯rst optimal targeting rule with the Phillips curves implies
that the aggregate in°ation rate is fully stabilized (¼u
t = 0) and that the aggregate consumption
gap is closed (b yu
t = 0). This result is quite standard in the literature and implies that the
optimal instrument rule is to equate the nominal interest rate to the natural interest rate.
However, the solution of the optimal monetary policy problem also features some motivation
for regional stabilization. These goals are clearly beyond the control of the common central
bank and the optimal plan as a whole can not be decentralized due the restricted set of available
policy instruments.
11For that reason, next sections explore the welfare implications of alternative ¯nancial struc-
tures under monetary policies that the common central bank may actually implement (b rt+1 = 0).
In the rest of the paper, we refer to these policies as feasible policies. The corresponding wel-
fare losses are expressed in terms of their distance to the optimal plan under complete ¯nancial
markets.
5 Dynamics under feasible monetary policy
In this section, we calibrate the model under both complete and incomplete ¯nancial markets.
We then analyze the dynamic properties in both cases and highlight the mechanisms behind our
results.
5.1 Baseline calibration
We calibrate the deep parameters of the model based on standard values found in the literature.
Following Beetsma and Jensen [2005], the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is ½ = 2. The
value of Ã refers to Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba [2006] and varies between 5 and 15. For the
baseline case, we choose Ã = 5. In the literature, estimates of ¹, the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and foreign goods, range from 1 to 15. For example, estimates of Harrigan
[1993] range from 5 to 12. We set ¹ = 2 and then check for robustness with other values of
this parameter. The elasticity of substitution across varieties determines the average mark-up,
which according to Rotemberg and Woodford [1997] is around 16-17% , implying µ = 7. We set
the openness parameter to ® = 0:25 in the benchmark calibration and, following Faia [2007],
we let it vary from 0:25 to 0:4. The parameter controlling nominal rigidities ranges, according
to di®erent estimates, from 0:5 to 0:8. Following Canzoneri et al. [2006], we set the baseline
value at ´h = ´f = 0:75. The portfolio cost parameter Â is set to 0:001, corresponding to an
average annual interest rate premium of 0:405%, in line with Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2003] and






5.2 Dynamics under complete ¯nancial markets
In the case of complete ¯nancial markets, the perfect risk-sharing condition holds implying that






12The intuition behind our results is that the pattern of external adjustment after an asymmet-
ric productivity shock and its internal consequences, as it can be seen through the expressions
of New-Keynesian Phillips curves, may signi¯cantly a®ect in°ation dynamics, which is the most
heavily weighted component of the welfare measure (Eq. 18).
Under complete ¯nancial markets, the dynamic system is described by Eqs. (5)-(10) and by
b rt+1 = 0; 8t. Figure 1 plots the IRF of interest variables in the monetary union after a unit
domestic productivity innovation in the case of complete ¯nancial markets.
A productivity shock generates a de°ation at home and the nominal interest rate drops
to stabilize aggregate in°ation. This policy translates into a positive demand shock for the
foreign country and implies a signi¯cant in°ation in this country (exactly equal to the domestic
de°ation). The dynamics of in°ation rates generates a positive (resp. negative) wealth e®ect
for home (resp. foreign) agents, allowing them to sustain higher (resp. lower) consumption
levels. The corresponding negative relative consumption gap implies a positive terms of trade
gap through the Backus-Smith condition. In other words, the terms of trade increase more than
in the natural equilibrium to meet the external equilibrium. The global pattern of external
adjustment relies entirely on terms of trade and the current account does not play any role.5
5.3 Dynamics under incomplete ¯nancial markets
The main di®erence with last paragraph is the introduction of an additional external adjustment
channel through the current account. As a consequence, paths of relative consumption and terms
of trade are determined independently. Under incomplete ¯nancial markets, the economy evolves
according to the system (11)-(17) augmented with the monetary policy b rt+1 = 0; 8t.
Figure 2 depicts the responses to a unit domestic productivity innovation. Similar to the
case of complete ¯nancial markets, domestic in°ation falls and foreign in°ation increases. The
adjustment pattern is somewhat di®erent, however. The fall and rise of home and foreign
in°ation is stronger in the ¯rst periods but the absolute cumulated response is lower.6 The gap
in relative consumptions is still negative, implying that home agents sustain higher consumption
levels thanks to the wealth e®ect induced by national in°ation rates dynamics. Contrary to the
5In the simple case of unitary elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, complete ¯nancial
markets even imply a constant zero net foreign assets position (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [2001]). Otherwise,
net foreign assets are determined after terms of trade dynamics and do not enter in the de¯nition of the dynamic
equilibrium.
6The cumulated response of in°ation is §0:3867 under incomplete ¯nancial markets and §0:3929 under com-
plete ¯nancial markets.
13Figure 1: Impulse response functions to a unit productivity innovation under complete ¯nancial
markets.















































































































Note: IRFs are in % of deviation from natural equilibrium.
14Figure 2: Impulse response functions to a unit productivity innovation under incomplete ¯nancial
markets.










































































































Note: IRFs are in % of deviation from natural equilibrium.
15case of complete ¯nancial markets, the gap in terms of trade is negative. In the case of incomplete
¯nancial markets, terms of trade volatility is lower than under complete ¯nancial markets and
lower than in the natural equilibrium. When shocks are transitory, agents are more prone to use
the current account as a device to smooth consumption over time and rely less on terms of trade
to adjust externally. Consequently, the shock implies an accumulation of net foreign assets and
terms of trade do not increase as much as they would with purely °exible prices, translating
into a negative terms of trade gap.
External adjustment to asymmetric shocks relies exclusively on relative prices under complete
¯nancial markets and more on quantities under incomplete markets. As a consequence, terms
of trade gaps are more volatile under incomplete ¯nancial markets but terms of trade variations
(st ¡ st¡1 = ¼f;t ¡ ¼h;t) and national in°ation rates (¼f;t and ¼h;t) are less volatile. Since
the volatility of national in°ation rates is the most weighted component of the welfare loss
function, incomplete ¯nancial markets exhibit welfare enhancing properties that may reverse
the traditional welfare costs associated with ¯nancial markets incompleteness.
6 Welfare costs/gains
In this section, we measure the welfare costs or gains arising under alternative ¯nancial structures
in a monetary union subject to asymmetric productivity shocks. We highlight (i) the welfare
losses of incomplete ¯nancial markets when prices are °exible and (ii) the welfare gains of
incomplete ¯nancial markets when the degree of price stickiness reaches a certain threshold. In
such a case, we show that ¯nancial markets incompleteness is associated with a lower volatility
of national in°ation rates since the external adjustment after asymmetric productivity shocks
relies more on quantities and less on terms of trade. For most plausible values of parameters
and as long as ´ is larger than 0:4, we provide evidence that the corresponding welfare gains
more than compensate the welfare costs related to imperfect risk-sharing. Finally, we assess the
robustness of our results by running a sensitivity analysis.
Welfare gains are expressed in terms of permanent consumption, so that,











T is the welfare in the reference situation. In order to decompose our results, the
reference situation will be the optimal plan under complete ¯nancial markets and the feasible
policy under complete ¯nancial markets alternatively.
166.1 Price stickiness and welfare
Welfare losses of alternative ¯nancial structures and monetary policies are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Welfare losses.
Flexible prices¤ Sticky prices
­inc=com ­com=opt ­inc=opt ­inc=com
Baseline 0.46 1.12 -1.41 -1.80
Ã = 10 0.33 0.84 -0.90 -1.23
Ã = 15 0.27 0.70 -0.69 -0.98
½ = 1 0.50 1.11 -1.62 -1.97
½ = 5 0.37 0.99 -1.09 -1.47
® = 0:35 0.25 0.95 -0.92 -1.32
® = 0:4 0.16 0.90 -0.76 -1.18
® = 0:5 0.00 0.87 -0.53 -1.01
¹ = 1 0.83 2.25 -2.91 -3.68
¹ = 5 0.20 0.41 -0.46 -0.62
¹ = 10 0.10 0.21 -0.19 -0.28
´ = 0:7 - 0.79 -1.15 -1.40
´ = 0:8 - 1.69 -1.70 -2.40
½a = 0:9 1.02 3.94 -1.23 -4.12
½a = 0:99 0.07 0.13 -0.25 -0.28
¤ for stability reasons, we set ´ = 0:0001 ' 0
Note: for ® = 0:5 under °exible prices, the loss is 0:0001%.
Consistent with other studies (see Kim et al. [2003a]), when prices are °exible, we ¯nd that
incomplete ¯nancial markets imply imperfect risk-sharing, generating welfare losses rising to an
average decrease of permanent consumption of about 0:5% (¯rst column of Table 1). Alter-
natively, interpreting the situation of °exible prices as a situation where independent national
monetary policies stabilize national in°ation rates, our results comfort those of Benigno [2007],
especially when home bias in consumption vanishes (® = 1
2). We also ¯nd that a better inte-
gration of goods markets, approximated by an increase of the openness parameter (®) or an
increase of the elasticity of substitution (¹), may lower the welfare losses of imperfect ¯nancial
integration, as documented by Cole and Obstfeld [1991].
When prices are sticky, we highlight the fact that in°ation variability is lower under in-
complete ¯nancial markets. As demonstrated by the analysis of response functions after an
asymmetric home productivity shock, incomplete ¯nancial markets introduce an additional ex-
ternal adjustment channel and restore the role of the current account. Since agents may use this
17channel to adjust externally, the pressure on terms of trade is lower. As a consequence, national
in°ation rates are much less volatile for most plausible values of parameters of the model, as
depicted in Table 2. The volatility of in°ation rates is even lower under incomplete ¯nancial
markets and feasible monetary policy than in the case of complete ¯nancial under the optimal
plan.
Table 2: Standard deviations (%) - Baseline calibration.
std(¼h;t) std(¼f;t) std(b cu




Flexible prices* ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡
Sticky prices
- Optimal policy 1:4207 1:4207 ¡ 0:1739 0:0217 0:0604
- Feasible policy 1:5070 1:5070 ¡ 0:0856 0:0695 0:0000
Incomplete ¯nancial markets
Flexible prices* ¡ ¡ ¡ 0:8813 0:7834 0:2682
Sticky prices 1:2580 1:2580 ¡ 0:9228 0:7773 0:3101
¤ for stability reasons, we set ´ = 0:0001 ' 0
In the loss function and for the baseline calibration, weights on in°ation are µ
2k ' 40 while
weights on terms of trade gaps in relative consumptions and relative hours are respectively
¹®(1 ¡ ®) ' 0:37, ½ = 2 and Ã = 5. As a consequence, welfare gains associated with lower
volatility of in°ation rates more than compensate for welfare losses related to higher volatility
of gaps in terms of trade, relative consumptions or relative hours. The situation of incom-
plete ¯nancial markets thus Pareto{dominates the situation of complete ¯nancial markets in a
monetary union characterized by sticky prices.
The welfare gains reported in the third and fourth column of Table 1 are clearly related
to the reduction of the volatility of in°ation rates caused by the use of the current account
in the external adjustment of the economies. In this case, the distortion related to ¯nancial
markets incompleteness, which is costly in terms of welfare when prices are °exible, generates
a positive externality through a lower volatility of national in°ation rates. The situation of
incomplete ¯nancial markets thus enhances the welfare of about 1:8% in average with respect
to the situation of complete ¯nancial markets under feasible monetary policy.
186.2 Sensitivity analysis
The sensitivity results may be summarized as follows:
(i): The Frischian elasticity Ã lowers the welfare losses independently of the ¯nancial struc-
ture, since °uctuations have less impact on hours worked.
(ii): The risk aversion parameter ½ is one of the most important. Under incomplete ¯nancial
markets, an increase of ½ increases agents' incentives to smooth consumption over time when
(unanticipated) transitory shocks arise. By this e®ect, ½ has a positive impact on welfare gains.
However, under complete ¯nancial markets, the Backus-Smith condition is binding and implies
that, for a given volatility of relative consumptions, higher values of ½ lower the volatility of
terms of trade required to adjust externally, i.e. the volatility of national in°ation rates. This
second e®ect more than compensates the ¯rst e®ect and the welfare distance between complete
and incomplete situations is reduced by an increase in ½.
(iii): The same applies to the openness parameter, ®. On one hand, ® increases the vol-
ume of goods traded and implies a higher volatility of the current account. Since the current
account is at the heart of our results, an increase of ® should amplify welfare gains associated
with incomplete ¯nancial markets. On the other hand, the risk-sharing condition shows that a
higher value of ® implies a lower response in the terms of trade to a given variation of relative
consumptions. The implied lower terms of trade and in°ation di®erentials volatility is welfare
enhancing and, again, dominates the ¯rst e®ect.
(iv): The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, ¹, has a negative
impact on welfare gains associated with incomplete ¯nancial markets. When goods become
better substitutes, the expenditure{switching e®ect is higher for a given variation of relative
prices, i.e. terms of trade, or the required variation of terms of trade to meet the external
equilibrium is lower. As a consequence, external adjustment through quantities becomes less
attractive and less e®ective in comparison to adjustment through prices.
(v): The nominal rigidity parameter has a positive impact on welfare gains associated with
incomplete ¯nancial markets. When in°ation di®erentials become more persistent, a situation
that lowers cumulated in°ation and provides a quicker adjustment is highly welfare enhancing.
Moreover, higher ´ is associated with lower ki and improves the weight of in°ation in the
welfare function. Running simulations across the whole spectrum of possible values of ´, we
also highlight in Figure 3 the fact that when prices become more °exible, there is a point at
19Figure 3: Welfare gains for di®erent levels of nominal rigidities (´) and of ¯nancial market
incompleteness (Â).































































































































































0which ¯nancial markets incompleteness becomes costly in terms of welfare. For the baseline
calibration of the model, the threshold value corresponds to ´ = 0:4. These simulations also
show that, when in°ation is not too costly, the bene¯ts associated with lower in°ation rates
through incomplete ¯nancial markets disappear. In such a case, just as in Benigno [2007], the
costs of imperfect risk-sharing dominate the costs of price stickiness. Figure 3 also reports the
welfare gains of ¯nancial markets incompleteness for varying values of portfolio management
costs. Our results are clearly unsensitive to variations in the value of Â since welfare gains range
from 1.85% to 1.69% when Â ranges from 0 to 0:01, which corresponds to an average annual
interest rate premium ranging from nearly 0% to 4%.
(vi): The persistence parameter ½a has a negative impact on welfare gains associated with
incomplete ¯nancial markets. Higher persistence generates less incentives for agents to smooth
the consequences of asymmetric shocks on their wealths and enhances their incentives to adjust
permanently. As a consequence, the appeal of smoother consumption and hours and lower
in°ation disappears as shocks become more persistent.7
7 Conclusion
This paper has argued that ¯nancial market incompleteness leads to welfare gains in a monetary
union subject to productivity shocks and sticky prices. This e®ect results from the fact that
incomplete ¯nancial markets are associated with a reduction of the volatility of national in°ation
rates in a monetary union, even when the aggregate in°ation rate is stabilized by the central
bank. Lower national in°ation rates are associated with higher levels of aggregate welfare
since agents highly penalize in°ation variations. Under complete ¯nancial markets, external
adjustment to idiosyncratic shocks implies terms of trade movements but the current account
does not play any role. Under incomplete ¯nancial markets, agents may use the current account
to smooth the consequences of asymmetric shocks di®erently across countries. This possibility
implies a smoother path for the terms of trade and national in°ation rates, which increases
welfare. For most plausible values of price stickiness, this e®ect dominates the welfare losses
of imperfect risk-sharing associated with incomplete ¯nancial markets, that are consequently
welfare dominant. We quantify the corresponding welfare gains to an average increase of 1.8%
in permanent consumption.
7Our results are robust to several extensions, such as the introduction of demand shocks, exempli¯ed in this
model by the introduction of public spending shocks (see Auray and Eyquem [2007]).
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We de¯ne the natural (Pareto-e±cient) equilibrium as the economic equilibrium arising when
prices are °exible under complete asset markets, i.e. ´h = ´f = 0 and Â = 0.












Using the pricing equations, ph;t = wh
t ¡ ah
























we get the natural path of the aggregate consumption, which also equals the aggregate output,
e yu






Combining the previous expression with the aggregate Euler equation, we determine the
natural equilibrium interest rate,
±
1 + ±






























In the natural equilibrium, the ¯nancial market is complete, implying,
2½e cr
t = ¡(1 ¡ 2®)e st:





e st = e wr
t ¡ e pr
t:






the relative leisure-consumption arbitrage condition becomes,
Ãe nr
t = e wr
t:
The relative pricing equation yields,
e st = e pf;t ¡ e ph;t = 2(e wr
t ¡ e ar
t);





e st + ar
t: (19)
On the other hand, the risk-sharing condition, combined with the relative equilibrium con-
dition on goods markets yields,
e yr




Using the relative production function,
e nr





t = ¡$®e st ¡ ar
t: (20)
Combining (19) and (20), we get the natural path of terms of trade,





Summing up, using the relative equilibrium condition of goods markets to get e cr
t, and the relative
production function to get e nr
t, we get,

















The quadratic welfare{based loss function

































































































¤2 = 0 (see
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Now focusing on Uu
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26We then manage to make the term [cu
t ¡ e cu
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In the next step, we show that 2nr
tar
t can be expressed as a function of e st, e cr
t, nr
t. We start



























t = (1 ¡ 2®)cr
t ¡ 2¹®(1 ¡ ®)st;
and using natural equilibrium expressions of e st, e cr
t, e nr
t,
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tnr
t + 2¹®(1 ¡ ®)e stst + t:i:p:











var(pf;t) ¡ ¹®(1 ¡ ®)[b st]
2
¡ (½ + Ã)[b cu
t ]
2 ¡ ½[b cr
t]
2 ¡ Ã [b nr
t]
2g + t:i:p + O
¡° °»3° °¢
;
where b xt = xt ¡ e xt are variables expressed in deviation to their natural equilibrium expressions.















where ki = (1¡´i¯)(1¡´i)
´i ;.
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2
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where t:i:p gathers terms independent of the problem and O
¡°
°»3°
°¢
high order terms.
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